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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief

of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of

professional interest to officers of the naval service.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are

those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy

Department or of the Naval War College.
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TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS
A Lecture delivered by

Major General W. R, Wolfinbarger, U. S. A. F.
at the Naval War College
10 October 1950

Admiral Cooley, members of the Staff, and students of
the Naval War College:
It is an honor and a privilege to be permitted to address
you today on a subject which is related to one of the three major
missions of the United States Air Force. Our Chief of Staff,
General Vandenburg, has made the following statement before the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives in
Washington:
"In the light of world conditions, in case of aggression
against the United States, the major tasks to be undertaken by
the Air Force in the defense of our country are clear:
First:

The delivery of an immediate and powerful strategic air
offensive against the basic sources of our enemy's war
making capacity.

Second: The defense of the United States and.our essential bases
against attack by air.
Third:

Tactical support of the Army and Navy in exploitation
of the opportunity presented through successful prose
cution of the first two. tasks."

This last mission is obviously an extremely important one
�nd is one to which the Air Force is devoting an increasing amount
General Wolfinbarger is the Commanding General ,of the Ninth
Tactical Air Force at Pope Air Force Base, Fort Bragg, N. C.
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of attention. Strategic Bombing arid Air Defense may catch the
public fancy and warrant the bulk of the newspaper publicity, but
this in no way indicates that the problems of Tactical Air Sup
port are being neglected.
In treating this subject of Tactical Air Support I shall en
deavor to confine my remarks to those aspects of the Tactical
Air problem which are appropriate to you gentlemen who are at
this school preparing yourselves for staff positions in higher head
quarters and as senior commanders.
My objective during this lecture is to tell you as much as
I can, in the short time available, regarding the problem of as
suring that the surface forces receive the best possible assistance
from the Air Force during combat operations.
I shall discuss principles involved, the methods of achieving
the necessary coordination between the surface forces and the air
forces, the capabilities and limitations of Tactical Air Power which
I believe must be recognized by key staff officers and commanders,
and finally, some of the trends in this type of operation that may be
affected by new development of weapons.
The measure of success we will achieve, when and if this
type of operation becomes necessary, - will depend directly upon
the proper definition and application of these principles, the de
gree of coordination achieved and a sound knowledge of the optimum
usage of the air weapons to be employed.
Before proceeding to the main points of discussion, I shall
limit and define the subject a bit more:
I shall here discuss primarily those elements of tactical
air power which are mainly engaged in making offensive strikes
2
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against enemy targets, and thereby of cou:i::oSe assist the surfac<;l
forces in the accomplishment of. their mission.
There are however other functions of tactical air which
will not be dealt with in detail during this hour, but which are
equally important; and it is vital that you bear these functions in
mind whenever you are thinking in terms of Tactical Air Sup
port or are engaged in discussions on the subject. Tactical Air
Support includes: maintaining air superiority in the area of op

erations; Air Defense of vital installations in our assigned area
of responsibility; tactical reconnaissance, which includes weather,
visual and day and night photographic reconnaissance; troop
carrying of airborne units and their equipment; air resupply ac
tivities and evacuation of casualties; and air courier and mes

senger service. These functions, which are absolutely vital to
the success of the surface forces, are usually completely ignored
by the arm chair experts, and the people who think that when
they have mastered the technique of furnishing close support to
a front line battalion or regiment, that they have learned all
there is to know about Tactical Air. In drawing conclusions on
this subject, always remember that the functions of a Tactical
Air Force include many responsibilities in addition to the re
quirement for close support of the ground force.
Before becoming involved in the details of doctrine and em
ployment of air support, it might be well to take a quick glance at
the over-all concept pertaining to operations in this field. In other
words, we should consider the conditions under which this air
ground or Air-Navy-Army team might operate in future war.
As an example, there are many who believe that it will
never again be necessary to launch a full scale amphibious invasion
with land, sea and air forces assaulting the enemy on a hostile
shore. Others profess to believe that such operations will be im-
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possible in the future.

Others say that practically all previous
I am sure we

concepts have been swept away by the atomic age.

all realize that past wars will never be re-fought and that circum

stances and weapons are constantly changing. However, be that as
it may, we believe that as long as our military establishment con

sists of three major components, land, sea and air, it is reasonable

to assume, that in the event of war in the immediate future, major
participation of all three services will be required. Furthermore, in

any mission which will require a two or three-service task force,

it is conceived that the tasks of supporting air would, in general,
be the same as they were at the end of World War II.

These then are the offensive tasks: we must have the

capability of air combat to maintain the necessary degree of air

!

superiority in the area of operations; we must have the capability

of striking targets whose destruction will prevent hostile supplies

and reserves from reaching the area of action of our ground or

sea forces; and we must have the capability of striking targets
which are actually resisting the advance of our supported force.

The means of achieving proper allocation of the tactical air

effort and of securing the necessary coordination between the serv
ices, as developed during the last war, were reasonably successful.

Thus it would appear that the broad principles which governed the

employment of tactical air support at the end of World War II are

still valid for the immediate future.

Newer and better weapons are being developed, aircraft

speeds are increasing, and tactics and techniques must be progress

ively modified at fairly frequent intervals.
ever are only seldom outmoded.

Sound principles how

There are five fundamental principles covering the Tactical

4
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employment of Air Power which I believe are still valid and which
deserve further comment here. These are:
1.

There must be centralized control of tactical Air Units which
are supporting surface forces.

2.

The effort of the Tactical Air Force and the surface forces
must be integrated.

3.

The gaining and maintaining of air superiority in the combat
area and in areas of projected operations of the surface
forces is vital in order to assure success of a major ground
or amphibious campaign.

4.

Interdiction of the battle area is the most profitable manner
in which to employ offensive tactical air units against
ground and naval targets in the support of armies and am
phibious forces.

5.

In accordance with the coordinated plan of operation, striking
elements of the Tactical Air Forces must attack and destroy
ground or naval targets in the immediate battle area.

The first two of these principles, which I have set forth, deal
with organization, and the relationship between the operating Army,
Navy and Air Force Headquarters. The other three principles bear
directly on employment or the manner in which the tactical air
striking units are utilized. All five together comprise the basis upon
which sound employment of tactical air power is :founded.
Having taken a brief glance at the items set forth on the
chart, let us examine each one a bit more in detail.
First is the matter of centralized control. Centralized control
is, of course, a basic military principle for the conduct of all military
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operations. This does not mean that one man controls the detailed
activities of every individual in a Tactical Air Force. It does mean,
however, that the organization and command structure must exist so
that, at any given moment, the air commander at any echelon of com
mand may take advantage of the inherent flexibility and mobility of
the air arm in order to divert air strikes to critical targets. He must
be able to concentrate the air power at his disposal on objectives
which require the application of the principle of mass. Through cen
tralized control, the preponderance-or even all-of the air effort
may be rapidly shifted in accordance with the changing require
ments of a fast moving tactical situation.
The second principle, dealing with integration of effort, also
affects the command and staff organization of the air and army
headquarters or the components of a joint force, and the relation
ship of the commanders at various echelons. You will notice that I
have said that the effort is integrated and not that the forces are
integrated. The forces must form a team the higher commanders
of which coordinate their efforts in order to attain a common ob
jective which is the rapid and effective defeat of the hostile force. T'o
achieve maximum effectiveness, each component of these coordinat
ed forces must operate under its own commander. The scheme of
employment of the air-surface team must be a coordinated action
from the inception of the planning for the operation to its com
pletion. I will discuss later how this coordination is effected.

I,
I

'

The next three principles of sound employment of tactical
air power bear directly on the manner in which the air striking
units are utilized. Number three is that the gaining, and maintain
ing, of general air superiority, or air superiority in the area of
combat and the areas of projected operations of the surface forces,
is vital in order to assure success of any major ground or amphibious
campaign. I do not believe that it will be necessary to develop this
portion of the doctrine any further before this audience. Many of

6
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you personally served in units which were 0 helping to develop and
prove the validity of this principle early in World War IL Through
out the war this principle was never questioned. Each successive
campaign, in every theater, reaffirmed its validity.
The fourth basic principle, which we use as a guide in con
ducting offensive air support operations, may be stated as follows:
The interdiction of the battle area is the most profitable manner in
which to use offensive tactical air units against ground and naval
targets in the support of armies and amphibious forces. It is
axiomatic that the severance of the enemy's lines of communication
compromises his ability to sustain, supply, deploy and reinforce his
forces. An enemy with this reduced capacity is certainly a less
formidable foe to oppose our supported units. Furthermore, enemy
men or equipment, destroyed before gaining contact with our own
forces, show the greatest net profit when balanced against the cost
of our offensive operations.
In conducting these attacks on lines of communication, and
here we are using the term in its broadest sense, the inherent
characteristics of the airplane permit the crew to seek out, if need
be, and successfully attack directly, troop concentrations, supply
points, railroad movements, troop and supply ships, harbors,
docks, headquarters and other facilities.
Troops in bivouac or on the move are always more vulnerable
than when deployed in combat. Supplies being moved on land or
on the sea, or assembled at storage or supply depots, are more con
centrated than when broken down for distribution or issue. Vulner
able points, such as bridges, viaducts, choke points, harbors and
docks, are easily identified from the air either visually or by elec
tronic devices. These factors result in a greater percentage of air
craft finding and advantageously attacking interdiction targets than
can be expected against deployed or dispersed targets.

RESTRICTED
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1951

7
11

Naval War College Review, Vol. 4 [1951], No. 2, Art. 1

RE1STRICTED
The fifth and last basic principle dictates that, in accordance
with the coordinated plan of operation, the striking elements of

the tactical air force attack hostile ground or naval targets in the
immediate battle area. Since this type of attack is in close prox

imity to our friendly forces, the tactical air force must exercise

close direction and control, and the maximum of coordination with
other friendly forces must be achieved.
Targets deployed in the battle area are usually not con
centrated and are therefore less vulnerable than targets in the

interdiction area. Troops are invariably dug-in, ground targets are

protected by the maximum of camouflage and concealment. Con
sequently, these targets are more difficult to pick up and identify
from the air. The probability is less that a given bomb, bullet or
rocket will do as much damage here as the same missile would if
fired on an interdiction target.
It goes without saying, that air crews must be carefully
trained in identification procedures. Control personnel on the
ground, and Army and Navy combat personnel, must likewise be
carefully schooled in marking, identification, and follow-up pro
cedures., Both Air Force and surface force commanders must never
be permitted to forget the importance of. the coordinated attack.
Battle experience has amply demonstrated that the greatest benefits
are gained if air attacks are immediately followed by assaulting
troops. The most remunerative air support targets on the bat
tlefield are those which are moving in a counter-attack, a shift in
deployment, or in a withdrawal.

We could sum up the principles I have discussed in one
sentence as follows: An air commander who has centralized control
of offensive tactical air power, and whose efforts have been inte

grated with those of the ground or amphibious force commander,
may, as the situation dictates, allocate or direct the mass of his of-

8
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fensive resources to counter air opera,tions, interdiction targets,
and/or direct participation in the surface battle area.
I have discoursed at some length about principles and I must
follow this up by reminding you that while principles are extremely
important, they are still only principles, and they have been created
to serve, and not to function as masters. It is sometimes easy to
become a slave of operating doctrine and principle, and every prin
ciple must be re-examined each time it is employed.

The highest degree of coordination between Air Forces and

Ground or Naval Forces in a theater or area of operations can only
be achieved through the establishment of a sound command relation
ship between the appropriate forces, and by the exercise of close
joint planning.

First let us consider organization. Normally, there will be a
theater or task force commander whose command will be either

unified or combined in n,ature. In this paper I will consider only
the unified command which is composed only of the armed services

of one country. In this case, the Theater Commanders staff is joint
and is composed of appropriate representation from each of the
three services. The forces within the theater are composed of
Army, Navy, and Air Force components. If the operations in the
Theater are of sufficient magnitude, the air component may consist
of a Strategic Air Command, a Tactical Air Command, and appro

priate supporting air cQmmands. However, I believe that normally
the strategic air forces would not be allocated to theater command
ers, but would be retained under control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Therefore in a normal situation it is entirely possible that all the
combat Air Forces operating under the Air Component commander

might be in one or more Tactical Air Commands. The subordinate
commands of the Air Force components of the theater forces would
then be The Tactical Air Command and appropriate supporting com-
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mands. And, in fact, the Tactical Air Command might be designated
as the Air Force component of the Theater Forces.
The Tactical Air Command would be composed of an appro
priate number of Tactical Air Forces, the Tactical Bomber Force, a
Troop Carrier Force if required, a Tactical Reconnaissance Wing,
and necessary service units.. The corresponding levels of command
between the Air Force and the Army are: THE ARMY GROUP
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND and THE FIELD ARM-TACTICAL
AIR FORCE.
The Theater Commander allocates the force to be employed in
the air-ground campaign to the Army Group and the Tactical Air
Command, if necessary, through the respective theater component
commanders. The Theater Commander establishes overall direc
tives and priorities of operations for the guidance of the Army and
Tactical Air Commanders. The Tactical Air Command is organized
to support an Army Group and has assigned to it an appropriate
number of Tactical Air Forces each of which is organized to sup
port a Field Army.

This type of organization of theater forces

provides for parallel levels of command which work together to
achieve the lateral coordination necessary for .the successful ac
complishment of the common. mission.
In an area which may be remote from a theater, or for
special tasks which may include the employment of Army, Navy
and Air Forces, Joint Task Forces may be organized. The com
ponents of a Joint Task Force may consist of appropriate table
of organization units such as the Field Army and a Tactical Air
Force or component task force. Either arrangement permits the
same lateral coordination between headquarters that exists in
the theater organization.

10
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This leads us to a discussion,. of command relationships
between the forces.
In the examples which I have given, you will always find
in every operation area, a common superior commander placed
above the two or three military component commanders. This
common commander issues a single directive to the air, naval,
and/or ground component commanders who are then jointly re
sponsible for the proper integration of their respective efforts

to insure that the coordinated action achieved is in the further
ance of the common objective. Here then, parallel levels of com
mand cooperate in planning and executing their operations. Yet

the integrity of the chain of command in each component is

preserved.

In air-ground operations, joint planning and command de
cisions are normally limited to the ARMY GROUP-TACTICAL
AIR COMMAND and the FIELD ARMY-TACTICAL AIR
FORCE, levels. Should there be a difference of opinion between
any two commanders, the matter is referred to the next higher

echelon of the air ground commands. For those matters which can
not be jointly resolved, the Theater or Joint Task Force Com
mander is the final and positive authority.

And now, I wish to comment on planning, which I con
sider one, or perhaps even the most important element necessary
for the successful accomplishment of Air Support. For any co
ordinated effort, it is vital that planning be conducted on a joint

basis, from the beginning. ,It must be carried through on a joint
basis and be properly and jointly blended into the operational

·phase.

In the air-ground operations, · joirit planning is carried on
at parallellevels of command down to, and including the ARMY-
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TACTICAL AIR FORCE level which is the lowest echelon which
plans and conducts independent operations.
At each level the corresponding headquarters are always
located as close to each other as is practicable and at the FIELD
ARMY-TACTICAL AIR FORCE level it is axiomatic that the
headquarters be located literally side by side. The Air and Ground
Commanders and their corresponding staff personnel are then
readily able to exchange information, formulate plans, and discuss
problems of joint interest. Even perfect communications, between
widely separated headquarters, cannot substitute for the frequent
personal contact between commanders and staffs in closely ad
jacent headquarters.
Joint planning should begin with the inception of the idea
for the operation. The first phases are accomplished jointly in
the theater headquarters and result in a broad but sound directive
to the commanders involved. Based on this directive, each lower
echelon of command develops its plan to include all information, and
the decisions, necessary to permit the subordinate Air and Ground
Commanders to accomplish their respective tasks. The evaluation
of the Air-Ground plan is based upon the principle of mutual accord
between Air and Ground Commanders. Differences of opinion are
effectively brought into the open and mutually resolved, and ex
perience has shown that it is a rare case indeed which must be
carried to the top command for final resolution. However, should
this be necessary the means of doing so exist, and in no case can
there be a case of "no decision". At the lowest echelon, the selec
tion of targets and the allocation of effort applied to air superior
ity, interdiction and close support, depends on the concurrence of
both the Air and the Ground Commander.
Operational planning is mainly conducted at the FIELD
ARMY-TACTICAL AIR FORCE level, however the plan for the

12
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nse of the Tactical Bomber support and its escort, and the
allocation of forces to the various Tactical Air Forces is conducted
at the TACTICAL AIR COMMAND-ARMY GROUP level. Con
ferences provide the. most efficient method of planning Air
Ground operations. These conferences usually consist of meetings,
of the Air and Ground Commanders and selected members of their
staffs. Operations and Intelligence personnel are particularly im
portant here. At these conferences both sides inform the other of
their respective plans, capabilities and requirements. A typical
agenda for such a joint conference would include a review of the
current battle situation, a weather forecast, a summary of di
rectives from higher authority, and a description of the current
Army and Air Force plan of action. Based on a conference of this
nature, detailed instructions are issued to the lower units. These
instructions must include specific tasks for each air unit and de
tailed instructions as to how coordination with specified Army
units is to be achieved.
I will now cover some of the capabilities and limitations of
Tactical Air Power which high-level staff officers and commanders
should recognize and bear in mind when planning or executing of
fensive Air Support Operations.
There are several types of factors which affect the degree
of air support that we are able to deliver. There are those tech
nical capabilities and limitations which are inherent in aircraft,
such as, the built-in speed, range, and maneuverability of the air
plane. It is unnecessary to discuss specific current airplane
characteristics here, since aircraft characteristics are subject to
continuous change. It is' necessary to mention, however, that
when it comes to designing aircraft for ground support, all the
characteristics must be carefully weighed against each other.
Strategic factors must also be considered.
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will affect the amount of air support which will become available.

The strategic concept, or the manner in which a war will be waged

has a great effect on the number of Tactical Air Forces and Air,

Support Combat units which will be included in the organization
,of our country's Air Force. It will also effect the rate of mobilization
and training of such un:fts as will be required: It affects the
priorities for type aircraft which will be produced.

Then finally we have the operational factors which affect the
availability and effectiveness of air support. The principal op- '
erational factors are: the mission and method of operation of the

supported unit, climate and weather, the terrain, and the number,
size and condition of the available airfields and their distance from

the front lines., All these factors have a great bearing on the ef
ficiency of an air unit and consequently effect the final availability
of air support to the surface force.
Now I should like to discuss new developments in aircraft

and electronics as pertain to tactical air requirements. Generally
speaking, 'technical developments, which affect Tactical Air Opera
tions, are progressing in a satisfactory and encouraging manner,
and I will mention some of the more important developments.
Much consideration and study has been devoted to deter
mining the advisability or inadvisability of developing special

ized types of aircraft to perform specific tactical missions. No one
airplane has yet been developed which will completely satisfy all
requirements. Different types of aircraft complicate logistics and
training, are expensive, and reduce the air commander's capability
in application of mass attacks. In short, flexibility is destroyed.
However, there is one common denominator which we believe all air

craft used in tactical air support operations must possess-that
is the ability to live in the air under intense enemy ground and
air opposition.

14
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In the field of. combat type aircraft, our future fighter
bombers, through the use of more efficient and more powerful jet
engines, and through improved aircraft design, will be capable of

carrying heavier armament loads and will be capable of greater
endurance. In this connection we must remember that the jet

aircraft is only in the infancy of its development. In the Korean
situation the jet aircraft has proved itself a formidable weapon.

Combat experience has proved that the F-80 fighter will take more

punishment from either air or ground fire than piston engine

fighters.

This contrasts with previous fears that the delicately

balanced gas turbine engines might be more easily put out of
action. Jet aircraft can now match piston engine planes in range
and capacity to carry bombs, rockets and guns, while far exceeding
them in speed and rate of climb. Jets are also easier to maintain.
The pilots "feel better" in jets.

They found that jets can take it
better than conventional types, and they can get out of hot spots
in a hurry or go upstairs and fight if attacked. On a broad
basis, the Korean situation consolidated previous views-we· know
we have to have a plane that can fight its way through enemy air
opposition and also do ground support work.
Beyond the fundamentals of jet fighter operations, the Air
Force didn't learn a great deal in South Korea because the one jet
type in service there was not especially designed for ground sup
port work and there were so few enemy jets in the .air.
Small units of other jet fighters and bombers, both de

signed for ground support, are expected to see combat in North
Korea. Undoubtedly the North Korean phase will see some changes
in operations because of' the tremendous advantage of air bases
near the battle line. The F-,;51. Mustang propeller fighter ex.;
tensively employedin Korea could hot ha'7e been used if the North
Koreans h�d employed a sizeable force ·of jets.
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What about the future of the Air Force in view of Korean
experience and the newly available funds for building up to the
"70-Group" idea?
Under the former limited funds program, the Air Force
could not do all its planners felt should be done, so it concen
trated on defense and strategic air problems that would have to
be met first in a major war.i The Anny ground forces, under sim
ilar money restraints, did not have enough divisions to justify
more emphasis on tactical air strength than was given it.
Now that is changed. There will be ground forces to sup
port and funds for development and funds to build and train an
Air Force for the job. New purchase orders will call for nearly
doubling the ratio of air defense and ground support planes to
medium and heavy bombers.
Without going into detail I wish to mention three funda
mental criteria of tactical aircraft to accomplish the tactical
mission. They are:
a.

The ability to live in the air.

b.

Provision for delivery of effective armament.

c.

Possession of effective radius of action.

With these three basic requirements in mind, let us turn to an ex
amination of the aircraft we now have in light of their capabilities
and limitations.
An example of a present-day tactical fighter aircraft is
the F-84E. Its speed of over 600 mph is considered satisfactory
for present day air-to-air operations. Climb to 30,000 feet in 10
minutes is unsatisfactory for intercept purposes. Endurance of
nearly 4 and ½ hours (only available when carrying 4 tanks)

16
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appears to be good; however, these estimates are obtained at high
altitude with maximum fuel and air-to-air armament. The F-84E
airplane is committed to day operations, in that it is not equipped
with night and all-weather navigational, intercept or bombing
systems.

In the tactical bomber field we have the North American
B-45 Tornado.. Its speed of well over 500 mph is acceptable today
for survival purposes during night and all-weather operations,
but marginal during daylight operations. This estimate is based
upon intercept probabilities. The gross weight of the B-45 is ex
cessive for operation from hastily prepared airstrips but its radius

of action should eliminate the necessity for its use of such airstrips.
The take-off ground run distance of 3,700 feet at gross weight
condition is at sea level under standard day condition from hard
surface airstrips. Its bomb loads are considered satisfactory for
present· and foreseeable future requirements. The B-45 is the
only all-weather airplane presently available to tactical air units.
It is equipped with an electronic navigational and bombing sys
tem.

The ground support aircraft to replace the F-84E will be
the swept wing F-84F manufactured by the same firm-Repub
lic. This aircraft is faster and has a better rate of climb than its
predecessor. Its various radii of action as pronounced by the
manufacture for the different armament loads are acceptable. It
appears that the F-84F possesses the dual capabilities for both
tactical air support and air interception. This aircraft will be
ready for mass production in the near future.

The aircraft which appears most capable of accomplishing
the over-all tactical fighter mission is the air support version of
the Lockheed F-94C. The aircraft was primarily designed for all

weather interceptor operation but lends itself readily to modifica-
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tion for the air support mission and tactical reconnaissance. In
general, the aircraft incorporates all the favorable features of
the F-80 but has nearly twice the power, a strong thinner wing
for higher speeds and loads, greater combat radius, and added
provisions for carrying external ordnance loads.
A . unique
feature of this aircraft is its dual speed brakes, a combination of
those used on the standard F-80 and F-86. It has, on occasion,
descended from 40,000 feet, landed and parked on the ramp in 2½
minutes. In a sustained vertical dive these speed brakes hold the
aircraft to a maximum of Mach. 7. Tactical Air Command has

requested higher authority for the procurement of this aircraft
which will be available in the near future.
The need for an aircraft capable of delivering armament on
selected targets under all-weather conditions and during hours of
darkness dictates a requirement for the tactical bomber. The
present bulk and weight of electronic bombing and navigational
systems preclude the use of a fighter type for this mission.
Furthermore, there are certain ta:i;gets and conditions where a
heavy, concentrated weight of bombs is more effective than that
capable of delivery by fighter-bomber attacks.

At present the Martin B-51, North American AJ-1, and
British Canberra are being evaluated. The B-51 is capable of re
markable speed. The British Canberra is very fast and man
euverable and possesses an exceptional combat radius under certain
conditions.
Today there is a tactical deficiency in adequate navigational
nd
bombing
systems. Fighter-bombers will be useless during dark
a
ness and bad weather until a miniature navigational system is
available and electronic air-to-ground ranging is perfected. Sys
tems presently being developed fall into two categories:
a.

Those which employ ground stations (predetermination

18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol4/iss2/1

RESTRICTED
22

War College: February 1951 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
of target coordinates limited to static situations over well
mapped territory) such a light weight Shoran; ground stations
and beacons.
b.

Those which are completely airborne.

The perfection of completely airborne electronic bombing
and navigational systems holds the greatest promise for all
weather tactical air operations. What is required is an elec
tronic replacement for the pilot's eyes so that close tactical sup
port can be undertaken under any weather conditions.

Another development is in ranging radar equipment for
the A-1 gun sight. This can be used to determine range in at
tacks on ground targets as well as air targets, resulting in in
creased accuracy for strafing and rocketry attacks. This system,
or similar development, will be a big step forward in providing
the single-seat fighter with all-weather air-to-ground capabilities.
At the present time our control system is equipped for
the most part with mobilized versions of static radar equipment
which were developed during the closing phases of the last war.
The height finders and the medium range search radars had many
deficiencies that have become increasingly more apparent as
techniques and aircraft change. Some of the major deficiencies
are:
a. Lack of suitable range.
b. Easily jammed by Electronic Counter Measures ac
tivities.
Lack of flexibility ( each function of the control system
requires a specialized piece of equipment, i. e., detection, location,
and control).
c.
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Planned improvements are:
a. The modification of the height finder equipment to
increase its range.
b. Medium range search radars are to be modernized by
the addition of a Moving Target Indicator kit. This modifica;..
tion will eliminate ground clutter from the scopes and will permit

only actual air targets to be shown. The next step for this piece of
equipment will be to replace it with a completely mobile version
for air warning and control of tactical air operations.
The communications equipment now used for the trans

mission of air-to-ground and air-to-air intelligence is becoming
obsolescent because of its slowness and vulnerability to Electronic
Counter Measures.
Our aim is to obtain an integrated control and communication
system sufficiently light-weight, mobile and capable of fulfilling
the requirements.

These are:

a.

Detection of airborne and surface objects (without beacon).

b.

Identification of detected objects.

c.

Location of detected objects.

d.

Control of friendly aircraft and missiles.

e. Continuous
communications.

air-to-ground,

air-to'-air

and

ground-to-air

Until the beginning of August the standard rocket arma

ment was the 5" HVAR. This rocket was only effective when
hits were registered on the tracks or the rear of the tank. They
were ineffective against the heavy armor on the front and only

20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol4/iss2/1

RESTRICTED
24

War College: February 1951 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
moderately effective on the turret. However, a 6½ ,., ATAR
rocket, with a "shaped charge" warhead on a 5" motor has been
tried with great success. These will penetrate 16" of armor
steel. (Joseph Stalin Mark III carries 11" of armor plate.) In

cidentally, napalm, when dropped from altitudes below 100 feet,
has proved to be most effective against tanks and troop concen
trations.
A new but very interesting development just getting un

derway is the convertiplane., A convertiplane may be defined as
a vertical rising aircraft having. conventional aircraft forward
speed capabilities. The second phase of this program will be to

build a light cargo convertiplane.

In the field of airborne-troop carrier operations the U. S.
Air Force has under development three (3) types of aircraft that

are expected to add versatility to this type of operation. · We have
under development, and now flying, the C-124 which has been

called a global troop carrier aircraft. It is capable of carrying a
fifty thousand pound pay-load or two hundred personnel. This air

craft is designed for the rapid loading and unloading of all types
of heavy military equipment with the exception of our largest
tanks.

We have under development several assault type trans

ports. These aircraft are designed to land troops and especially
heavy military equipment into small unprepared airfields. As
sault type transports in general are designed to carry out the
functions performed by gliders during the past war in a more rapid
and efficient manner.
Many aircraft manufacturers are presently making engineer-

ing design studies to determine the feasibility of development of
pod carrier aircraft. These design studies apply to both convention
al aircraft and to the helicopter. The purpose of this type air

craft is the rapid re-supply of an airhead or other activity by air-
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craft capable of lifting a pre-loaded pod or carrier unit from a
rear base into a forward base. As a matter of fact, Hughes Air
craft Company is now ground testing their XH-17 Flying Crane,
which is a helicopter powered with two J-35 engines, which are
normally rated at 5,000 pound thrust, driving a 136 foot rotor.
This aircraft is designed to meet an Army need for short haul of
heavy equipment such as tanks or artillery across terrain hither
to impassible.
All these developments clearly indicate that much thought
and energy is being devoted to the technical aspects of the de
velopment of tactical air. There is no indication that the subject
of Tactical Air Support is being allowed to stagnate in either the
technical, tactical or theoretic fields.
Now in closing, I wish to touch on one more subject,
which is of great interest to me and which I am sure will in
terest this audience. I refer, of course, to the tactical employment
of Atomic Weapons. On this subject I can only apply a little de
ductive reasoning. We are all aware that the stockpile of A-bombs
is increasing rather than diminishing. As this stockpile of
available weapons increases, more and more consideration is being
given to diversified employment; that is, to uses in addition to the
primary strategic use. I do not pretend to know what our present
stockpile of these weapons is, but I do know that the problem of
tactical employment of this weapon is receiving much serious at
tention by many people whose business it is to consider these mat
ters. I consider it self-evident atomic weapons will be an accepted
part of tactical air operations in the near future and that they will
have a profound effect on the conduct of both land and sea war
fare. It may be that we will never have enough of these weapons
to permit us to be prodigal in their use, but you may be assured
that when the objective is important enough, these weapons will
be used.
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MAJOR LOGISTICS LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II
A Lecture delivered by

Lt. Comdr. Kent D. Algire, SC, USN
at the Naval War College
on 7 November 1950

Time brings the truth to light.
(Greek proverb)
The subject of this paper is "Major Logistics Lessons of
World War II," or-"Enough was Too Much." I think it would be
better if we calied it "Some Major Logistics Lessons of World War
II," because we can't go into all of them here, and therefore I have
selected a few that I feel are among the most important. Actually,
nearly everybody has his own ideas on a subject like this one. And
that's perfectly natural-all I can do here is to give you a sort of
kick-off, to give you some ideas which you can think about, dis
card, or add to, in accordance with your own convictions. The main
point is to get our thoughts focused on the logistic aspect of war.
You know, if we take Webster's word for it that a lesson is some
thing that is "learned," I sometimes wonder if we should talk
about lessons at all.
Now-looking at the title again, it is easy to see that in
order to condense this sort of discussion into an article of this
size we will have to put some artificial limitations on the area we
cover. Now, as I see it, we should take the most important things
first, and I would say that lessons on an international antl national
scale would, generally speaking, be the most important. Next, we
have the overall military problems, and then the individual mili
tary departments. After that we have the theater problems and
finally the operating forces themselves. Now, since we can't cover
all these areas completely, I decided to do it something like this:
Lt. Comdr. Algire is a member of the staff at the Naval War College.
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This illustrates graphically the entire area of logistics ap
plication, from international, at the top, to operating forces, at the
bottom. Now, as I said, I feel we should cover the top three di
visions as fully as we can-that is-the international, national,
and over-all military. Then as we drop to the single service levels,
and on down, I think it appropriate to concentrate on the naval as
pects. Of course, at the theater level, because of the unified nature
of the command, it is difficult to divorce one service from the others.
In addition to considering the areas where we may find
logistics lessons, let's stop for a minute and see what kind of
logistic lessons we might uncover. Of course, I could just recite
as many lessons as we have space for, but I think it will help in ap
proaching the problem if we can group the lessons into general
categories. Probably there are several such categories we could use,.
but, to me, there were three that seemed the most logical.
First, and possibly most important, lesson in PRINCIPLE.
Lessons · learned

in

principle

would

be

reflected in

ORGANIZATION.
And last, as they say, but not least, we had our lessons in
OPERATION.
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Now, if we think of the areas of logistics application, and
of the three broad categories into which logistic lessons might fall,
it may help us to understand a little better the significance of
these lessons. This is intended simply as a sort of an orientation
aid, and I will not attempt to pin-point each lesson into an area
or category. Actually, by their nature, these lessons must overlap
each other.

It

has been said by many well qualified people that World

War II was a war of logistics. It was characterized by the totality
with which manpower and resources were mobilized and by the

energy with which the two sides attempted to destroy each other's
material resources for war.

If we recall the bombing campaigns

of both the Axis and the Allies, if we remember the desperate

battle of the Atlantic sea lanes and the enormous magnitude of

lend-lease shipments, we realize the part that materiel played
in the world's greatest war.

Now, as we know, all wars have not followed this pattern.

Of course, every war has presented its own problems of equip

ment and supply.

But the crudeness of weapons and equipment,

the relatively undeveloped industrial systems, and the slow and
inefficient means of transportation for a long time restricted war
fare to a relatively limited basis. As weapons have become more
destructive, as industry has developed, and as transportation has
become more rapid, the tempo and the extent of wars have risen
until now it is common to speak in terms of total war.
About this time of year a number of our students are
wrestling with the comparison of war potentials. When you try to
make such a comparison you become aware rather quickly of the

number and complexity of the factors involved in. a present day
war effort.
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This was recognized by our top man in the last war. and is
illustrated by some of his own words. This is a quotation:
"The war in Europe has reached the final decisive
phase-the attack on Germany itself. But we have much
longer and much farther to go in the war against Japan.
"All these operations had to be planned far in advance
-and that does not mean merely drawing arrows on maps.
It has meant planning in terms of precisely how many men
will be needed, and how many ships-warships, cargo
ships, landing craft-how many bombers and how many
fighter planes-and how much equipment and what types
of equipment down to the last cartridge. And it has meant
getting all of them to the right place at the right moment.
"It has meant establishing for our Army and Navy sup
ply lines extending over 56,000 miles-more than twice
the circumference of this earth."
The man who spoke those words was the late Franklin D.
Roosevelt, speaking in 1944.
If there is any single logistic lesson that can be drawn from
World War II, I think it must be this.

NATIONAL LOGISTIC STRENGTH HAS A CONTROL
LING IMPORTANCE AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN NATIONAL
WAR POTENTIAL.
I believe that in any major war between world powers, the
victor must have substantial and sustained superiority in the qual
ity and quantity of its weapons and supporting equipment. To have
this superiority it must have, or have access to, a preponderance of
national logistic strength-that is, the resources, the manpower, the
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production facilities plus the transportation to direct this power
against the enemy.
You know, in contests of any kind, we usually learn most of

the lessons from the losers. After the Nurnberg executions, one of
the few persons left alive, who had served on the Armed Forces High
Command (the OKW), was General Walter Warlimont, who had

been on that assignment six years and was General Jodl's deputy.
In a document he prepared after the war he had this to say:
"In any event, one fact has definitely been established
by Germany's experience in World War II: Even though
daring plans in the fields of strategy and operations, ex
emplary military performances, and several other impond

erables may offer favorable prospects to the weaker party
during the course of hostilities, the entire war potential
of a nation is in our time the decisive factor in a life-and

death struggle among peoples. This potential is com
posed of quantities which must be computed with math
ematical precision.

"The demands which Hitler's conduct of the war made

upon the German people exceeded. the limits of their
capabilities in every respect."

Now, with 'national logistic strength assuming such a
dominant role in our war potential, it becomes essential that we
be able to harness this strength with a swiftness comparable to

the speed of purely military mobilization. I realize that, with
anything as complex as our industrial and economic system, this
can never be easy or foolproof. Even so, it certainly seems obvious
that we should work out a system of national mobilization now so
that at least the system will be set up in plan form ready to be
executed, not devised, when war comes.
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Let's look for a moment at what happened in World War

II. In the early thirties, plans were begun which were intended to
provide the formula for economic mobilization.

There were sev

eral revisions, but in 1940, a plan was on the books which was sup
posed to be triggered by a mythical M-Day.

was never used.

This plan, as such,

Various reasons have been given; some say

that Roosevelt was reluctant to allow any person other than him

self to assume the powers that would accrue to the administrator
of the plan, while others point out that because of the piecemeal

manner in which he became involved in the war, the M-Day which
was to trigger the plan never occurred.

In any event, what actually happened was the trial and

error development of a scheme to effect the diversion to war of an

industry which is traditionally governed by the law of supply and

demand. Agency after agency was set up, and many of these were

designed just to correct the shortcomings of their predecess'.:>rs.

The resulting network of alphabetical agencies consisted in a large

degree of collections of confused and ineffective transplanted dollar
a-year men.

I've picked out a number of these agencies and listed

them here. Remember, though, that this is not all of them by any
means.

SP AB-Supply Priorities and Allocations Board
OPM-Office of Production Management

OPACS-Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply
OEC-Office of Export Control

EDE-Economic Defense Board

DDAR-Division of Defense Aid Reports

OLLA-Office of Lend-Lease Administration

OCD-Officer of Civilian Defense

OFF-Office of Facts and Figures
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These were some of the pre-Pearl Harbor agencies. And
here are some of the better known ones that came later after
pearl Harbor:
WPB-War Production Board
OPA-Office of Price Administration
WMC-War Manpower Commission
NWLB-National War Labor Board
ODT-Office of Defense Transportation
WSA-War Shipping Administration
NRA-National Housing Agency
I think this may be a good time to state our second lesson.

WE MUST HAVE A PLAN FOR SWIFT NATIONAL
MOBILIZATION, CONSISTENT WITH OUR ECONOMIC AND ·
POLITICAL SYSTEM.
Notice, please, that I have used the words "consistent with our
economic and political system". I feel that we must always keep in
mind the delicate balance of the system under which we prefer to
operate. There are so many economic forces involved in this system
that any plan we use must take into account the possibility of
creating dangerous local disruptions and hardships.
But even more important is the problem of politics in a
democracy. No one can predict the temper of a future Congress.
And Congress is always reluctant to commit its successors to broad
governmental blueprints. However, I personally feel that this prob
lem of national mobilization must be met the same way that we meet
the problem of military mobilization. And I think that industry
wants it met that way. When I was a contracting officer in Wash
ington a little over a year ago I had any number of business people
come in and ask what their part in a mobilization would be. Other
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contracting officers had the same experience. And, remember, these
firms were not looking for current business; they were plenty busy
with current orders. They just wanted to know what their part in
mobilization would be so that they could avoid the confusion of the
last war.
Now, I'm certainly not in any position to say whether we are
slipping back into the piecemeal approach we had in the last war. I'm
not sure any one is. But at least we do have the NSRB and the
Munitions Board working away at the problem in two important
areas. I think they are ahead of where we were in 1940, if only
because of our World War II experience. Unfortunately, I'm
afraid the perennial Washington Battle of Bailiwicks is taking its
toll of speed and efficiency.
You know, not too long ago a knowledge of logistics was not
considered to be of any particular advantage to officers generally.
In fact, the tendency was illustrated right here at the War College.
In 1926, Captain R. R. Backenhus succeeded in setting up a logis
tics section here, and started a system of committee projects in
which naval campaigns were analyzed logistically. However, the
succeeding head of the logistics section said that such matters as
shoveling coal and combat loading didn't belong with the study of
the principles of war, so they abolished the section and abandoned
the study of logistics-for about twenty years.
Unfortunately there has always been a natural tendency
on the part of people who have to make plans to figure out some
strategy and then assume that there would be enough logistic sup
port. This worked all right when there was more support available
than the military needed or could use. But as we all know, the size
of the last war caused us to realize that somebody had to be planning
the logistics as well as the strategy, because the logistics often got
to be the limiting factor. Unfortunately, because it had never been
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too important, there were almost no officers who fully understood
the problems of logistics. That didn't make the problems any less
real, and officers who were put in positions of logistic responsibil
ity just had to learn the hard way. Because these positions were
gradually recognized as key billets, the services began to realize
that we must have high calibre officers who had more than a passing
knowledge of logistics.
Recently, I asked Admiral Carney for his idea of what points
I should cover in this talk. He placed great emphasis on the fact
that we started the war almost entirely tactical-minded and had to
learn to be logistics-minded. And he said that as DCNO for Logis
tics, he had had no more important project than the creation of an
educational system in the Navy concerning logistics.
I think this points up the third major lesson.
WE HAVE RECOGNIZED LOGISTICS AS A MILITARY
AND, ADDITIONALLY, THE NECESSITY FOR
IENCE,
SC
THE TRAINING OF HIGH CALIBER OFFICERS IN
LOGISTICS.

I think this principle has been recognized now by all the
services. Logistics courses are incorporated in the curricula of
all of the service Colleges and, in addition, the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces devotes its whole course to the producer phase
of logistics. Also, more top-rated officers are now occupying billets
which are essentially logistic in nature-as for example, the G�4,
Air Force Materiel, CNO Logistics, Munitions Board, and NSRB.
In 1945, Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt was detailed to make a re
port and recommendations in regard to the structure of the armed
forces, This study was used in Congressional discussions on uni
fication. One of the conclusions in the report reads in part like this:
"It is believed that logistic planning of the scope reRESTRICTED
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quired by this last war must be recognized as a military
science in itself, a sine qua non to success in strategy and
tactics."
Well, now I've talked about the part logistics plays in thi

national picture, how industry must be tied in, and how logistics hai

developed as a military science. This gets us down to the point oJ

military planning-I use "military" to mean all of the armec
forces-and, in particular, the relationship between strategic anc

logistic planning. To get a better picture of this, I think we migh1
look back to the early days of the war.

The way the Japanese pulled their Pacific fait accompli in
1941 put us just posterior to a large black logistics eight-ball.
Everybody needed supplies and there weren't enough for anybody.

As Admiral King said to the Secretary in 1942: "it was evident

that no matter how much material of all types was produced in
1942, it would not be enough." Naturally, each service felt justi
fied in trying to procure as much for its own purposes as possible.
The Eberstadt Report points out that if it had not been for the fat
that existed in our economy at the time, this sort of willy-nilly pro
curement could have led us to disaster. Now, in the meantime, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had held their first meeting in February
of 1942, were beginning to fashion our over-all strategy. The
strategic plans of the J. C. S. assigned tasks to the services and es

tablished, in broad terms, the numbers and types of military units
required. Then they got out strategic concept papers, preliminary
campaign studies, and strategic deployment summaries. That's

quite a bundle of papers. But those concept papers and cam
paign studies were very general in nature and they weren't
official, only informational-so they weren't much use in logistic
planning. And the deployment summaries were at first pre
pared by the individual services; based on availability of forces, not
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requirements. In other words they would say: "Because we have
100,000 men available, we will deploy them in X overseas theater.;''
This did not consider whether they could be supported in that
theater. Well, you can see that this sort of procedure put logistic
planning on a dangerously inexact basis.
Now, after 1943, a lot of this difficulty was eliminated by
the work of the Joint Logistic Committee-part of the J. C. S. or
ganization. Admiral Badger told us about some of the things they
did. Even so, as late as 1945, there was an interesting example of
what not to do that illustrates what I am driving at. Now, these
things happened in all the services and this is just an example that
seemed to be appropriate. The Army Air Force decided to deploy
certain types of planes in the Pacific, and scheduled production ac
cordingly. But the joint logistic planners found that existing air
fields in the Pacific, plus those in base development plans, could
not accommodate the airplanes. The result was that planes and
parts that could not be used had been produced at the expense of
other needed items.
The lesson I am trying to illustrate is this:

CONCURRENT STRATEGIC AND LOGISTIC PLAN
NING IS ESSENTIAL, AND AS A COROLLARY-WE MUST
HAVE LOGISTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PROCEDURES
WHICH WILL MAKE POSSIBLE EFFECTIVE COORDINA
TION OF OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC PLANNING.
That's a mouthful; and probably you've heard it stated be
fore. It may even sound elementary, but some things that seem ele
mentary, after you know about them are not so obvious beforehand.
For instance, although you wouldn't believe it, it is a fact that even
under wartime conditions the Director of the Logistic Plans Division
in CNO was not given access to the "Top-Secret" dispatch board of
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the Commander-i:ri-Chief until late in 1943, two years after the war
began.
Today, as you know, the situation is considerably different.
We now have well-established logistic organizations in the form of
the Munitions Board, G-4, Air Materiel, and DCNO Logistics, and
these are integrated into the military command structure. And we
have officers in these positions who have earned the confidence and
respect of their own and the other services. When strategic plans
are made nowadays, they are made with the advice and concurrence
of astute people whose primary duty is to keep a running estimate
of our national logistic capability.
Now I'd like to turn to a little different field: that of
Atomic Energy.
The power of the atomic bomb is well known to all of us. Now,
not many people maintain that this weapon was responsible to a
very large degree for the winning of the war. On the other hand,
though, think what might have happened if the Axis had perfected
this thing first !
We have all heard that there were some efforts made by
Germany in the field of nuclear research. Their efforts however
were nothing compared with our enormous projects, but there is
sufficient evidence to show that the German scientists were on the
right track.
In 1942, the leading German physicists held a meeting at
which possible military application of atomic energy was discussed.
They invited the Nazi military leaders to attend this meeting.
General Keitel's answer to that invitation said essentially this:
"You will understand, of course, that I am too busy at the
moment and therefore have to decline." In other words, a polite
brushoff. And Himler wrote that unfortunately he would be out of
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town the day of the meeting. Admiral Roeder also regretted. I think

we owe a debt of gratitude to the myopic vision of German official
dom in regard to this particular investigation.
I think this serves as an illustration of our next major
lesson. And I feel that it has strong logistic implications because
it has to do with the means of waging war..

THE LESSON IS THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS CONTINUALLY INCREAS
ING.
The United States recognized this in the establishment of

the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the last war.
Of course, scientists are not generally military-minded, and at first

there was a gap between the services and the scientists. But as offi
cers learned how to use the laboratories and as scientists were

sent right into the combat zones to learn what the problems were,
this gap was broken down. This was a rather slow process, but
fortunately in World War II we could afford the luxury of
slowness. I don't think many people feel that we can afford this
luxury in another major war.
Now, you can't assign somebody to make a discovery, any
more than the Patent Office could answer the veteran who wrote in
and asked for a list of "all the uninvented inventions". No one can
be sure where the next discovery will appear.. So you need to have
a means of keeping in touch with science as a whole. And, also, of
course, you have to set up projects in fields where there appears to
be military application.

When the Office of Scientific Research and Development was

disestablished, the services began to set up their own formal or

ganizations to foster research. The Navy, benefiting by the vision

of Vice Admiral Harold Bowen, took the lead and, in 1946, set up
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the Office of Naval Research. And, shortly afterward, as you know,
the Research and Development Board, which operates at the J.C. S.
level, began to take shape.

Because of these organizations, plus other service offices
now devoted to research, the military is becoming more closely as

sociated with scientific research. With the Russians making the

progress that they are, I think you'll agree that we can harq.ly af
ford to forget this lesson.
Now to change the subject again.

Recently I was looking

through a wartime list of Naval Bases overseas and noticed some

very interesting facts. For instance, in 1944 we had apprqximately
620 bases overseas, and note that this figure excludes any purely
Army or Air bases. That's quite a few bases, and when you think
how much even a small base costs in terms of material, manpower
and the inescapable overhead, 620 bases represents a very substantial drain on our resources. Now, I'm not in any sense intending
to convey the idea that these bases weren't useful. We all know
that they were very useful. And in many cases they were the only
thing that saved the day.

,.,

But I came across some other very interesting facts in that
list of Bases. There were 158 bases either disestablished or aband
doned before VJ-Day. There were a good many others on which

the date wasn't given, and probably at least part of these too were
disestablished or moved before the end of the war. Now every
time a base is moved or rolled up, it takes a lot of labor and a lot
of shipping space to get it somewhere else., And of course it takes

mjore labor to unload it and set it up in a new location. And it
takes time, quite a bit of time. So when we talk about moving

or
rolling up one-fourth of all our . bases, we are talking about an
.
.
operation of considerable size in itself. Of course, any bases we

had to abandon are just that much material thrown away.
38
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Maybe I'd better stop wandering and tell you what I'm lead

ing up to. What I've just been saying was intended to give you
an idea of what our tremendous network of bases cost us in the

last war. I feel that a good part of the support that these bases

rendered to the operating forces could have been given just as well

by floating bases. Those of you who are familiar with Commodore
Carter's Servon 10 or our own Admiral Beary's Logistic Support
Force know what these outfits can do.

The floating bases can

service fleet units in port and the mobile support forces can keep
the combat units right in the battle area for weeks at a time if

necessary. I think we can draw a very important lesson from all
this.

WE MUST A VOID UNNECESSARY BASES AND CON
STRUCTIONS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE USE OF
FLOATING SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING FORCES.
I would like to point out again that I am not intending to·

detract from the importance of keeping up our development of ad

vance base techniques. For certain purposes they are irreplaceable.

For instance, we can't very well build a floating airfield, even

though some people would like to. And there are many other cases
where you just can't use a floating base-as for example where
there isn't sufficient harbor. But I believe that the idea of float
ing support is something we can all think about with profit.. It's

a coming thing. It's usually cheaper, it can move or disperse to
avoid atomic attacks, and you can have it where you need it
without having to bargain for shipping space. Admiral Low told
me recently that Admiral Sherman is strongly behind this idea. So,
you might say that, unlike so many things for which there is no

other reason, it is policy too .

. Well, that's six lessons. There are many more I could give,
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but I will limit this discussion to one more. There are so many that

seem deserving of mention. For instance, there is the problem of
packaging and marking (a lesson I'm not sure we learned) ; there is

air transportation; there are the new engineering techniques like
These are all important
And there is another one that I think we might bring up

the artificial harbors and floating docks.

lessons.

as a particular subject for further study. That is the question of
shipping control. We learned something about land traffic control
in the first World War, but the more extensive second war forced
us to do something about getting the most out of our ocean·shipping.
This is a parti:::ularly difficult problem to solve.
But there was one lesson that had its roots right in the

firing line and yet had implications clear up to the national level.

I'll have to explain this a little bit with some examples.

In planning an individual operation, one of the things the

commander has to figure out is his requirements for all of the

items to be used in the operation. He does this essentially by mul
tiplying the forces involved by various usage factors and then

multiplying the result by his own judgment factor.

If he has

good usage data and knows the conditions under which it was

gathered, he will rely on it.

Then his judgment factor adds in his

own knowledge of this particular operation.

But if he doesn't un

derstand the usage data, or doesn't trust it, then he is forced to

make his judgment factor more of a wild guess or a maybe pious
hope.

The equation: (Forces x Usage Factors) J. F.,

= Require

ments is perhaps oversimplified, but generally speaking, the re

quirements equal the forces times the usage factor, times the
judgment factor; and if the usage factor is good, the result can be
fairly good.
factors:

But look what happens if we have

40
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(Forces x ?)

?

=

?

The commander's J factor becomes another question mark and the
result is often fairly horrible. Most of you can. probably remem

ber seeing somewhere in your travels the visible results of this sort
of situation in the form of huge piles of rusting or rotting equip
ment.

I think we can draw another significant lesson from this.

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE COLLECT AND TABU
LATE GOOD USAGE DATA THAT INCORPORATES THE
OPERATING EXPERIENCE UNDER WHICH IT IS AC
CUMULATED.
Now what I've said was intended to show how this busines
of usage data can affect individual operations. But it has much
more important implications. For instance, think of the part that
it plays in determining storage levels at points along the pipe line
to the front. Storage space is almost always at a premium in war
time. And at even more of
premium is transportation. If we

a

have to store or ship too much of one thing it means sacrificing
something else that actually may be needed worse.
Finally, this problem extends up to the Munitions Board, and
the NSRB, and even back to industry itself. Lately, you know,

there have been some remarkable development in the field of rapid
electronic computation, and there have been efforts to apply these
computers to the logistic field, on a national level. The trouble
always is that if you don't know what to put in one of these gadgets,
you are up against the quickest means of making mistakes yet

devised.

Looking at the national picture, this usage data really gets
to be a problem. You know, quite a few logisticians have made a
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name for themselves by ·always having inore on hand than wa$'
needed. This may get good fitness reports, but I submit that with
every resource of the nation strained as it would be� too many out.:.
standing logisticians of this variety might well lose our next war for
us. We have to know what we need, so that we are able to make
enough of everything. I don't think we can afford to make too many
gross errors in production as we had last time.
Just as a final example of what I mean-in the last war we

manufactured 21 million tons of ammunition. Half of that got over
seas. Four million tons, orJess than a fourth of it was shot at the

enemy. Now, I certainly don't advocate trying to shoot the last man

with the last bullet, but 17 million tons extra does seem to be. a
little too much.

Now, as a summary, I would like to restate these seven

lessons in condensed form.

1. NATIONAL LOGISTIC STRENGTH HAS A CON
TROLLING IMPORTANCE AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN NATION
AL WAR POTENTIAL.
2. WE MUST HAVE A PLAN FOR SWIFT NATIONAL
MOBILIZATION, CONSISTENT WITH QUR ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL SYSTEM.
3. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED LOGISTICS AS A MILI
TARY SCIENCE.
4. CONCURRENT STRATEGIC AND LOGISTIC PLAN
NING IS ESSENTIAL.
5. THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS
CONTINUALLY INCREASING.
42
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6. WE MUST AVOID UNNECESSARY BASES AND
CONSTRUCTIONS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE USE OF
FLOATING SUPPORT.
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE COLLECT AND TABU
LATE GOOD USAGE DATA THAT INCORPORATES THE OP
ERATING EXPERIENCE UNDER WHICH IT IS ACCUMU
LATED.
7.
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